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Feminist Debates on Civilian Women and International
Humanitarian Law
Valerie Oosterveld*
International humanitarian law [IHL] provisions address
the situation of civilian women caught in armed conflict today,
but is this law enough? Feminist commentators have considered
this question and have come to differing conclusions. This article
considers the resulting debate as to whether female-specific IHL
provisions are adequate but underenforced, or inadequate, outdated and in need of revision. One school of thought argues that
the main impediment to the protection of female civilians during
hostilities is lack of observance of existing IHL. A second school of
thought believes that something more fundamental is needed to
meet the goal of protecting civilian women during war: revision
and reconceptualization of IHL to take into account systematic
gender inequality. This article considers the status of this debate
within three areas of IHL considered by many to be central legal
aspects of the experience of female civilians caught in armed conflict: the general non-discrimination provisions, the specific protection for civilian women against sexual violence and the specific protection of pregnant women and mothers. It concludes that,
while there has been a vibrant debate within feminist circles on
the adequacy of existing IHL provisions, mainstream action has
tended to focus on enforcement. This is unfortunate, as it means
that certain insights into the impact of deep gender inequalities
on conflict have largely been left unexplored.
Les dispositions du droit international humanitaire [DIH]
traitent de la situation de femmes civiles prises de nos jours dans
un conflit armé, mais ces lois suffisent-elles? Des commentatrices féministes ont songé à cette question et en sont venues à des
conclusions différentes. Cet article porte sur le débat qui en résulte à savoir si les dispositions du DIH spécifiques aux femmes
sont adéquates mais pas suffisamment mises en vigueur, ou si elles
sont inadéquates, surannées et doivent être révisées. Une école de
pensée soutient que l’obstacle principal à la protection de femmes
civiles au cours d’hostilités est l’inobservation du DIH existant.
Une deuxième école de pensée croit qu’il faut quelque chose de
plus fondamental pour atteindre le but de protéger les femmes
civiles pendant une guerre : la révision et la reconceptualisation
du DIH pour tenir compte de l’inégalité systématique entre les
*

University of Western Ontario, Faculty of Law. I wish to thank Katherine Ferreira for her
excellent research assistance and Margaret Martin and two anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments on drafts of this article. Thanks also to Nicole LaViolette for her thoughtful
suggestions on this topic.

(2009) 27 Windsor Y.B. Access Just.

385

386

Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice

2009

sexes. Cet article examine l’état de ce débat dans trois domaines
du DIH que plusieurs considèrent être des aspects légaux qui se
situent au centre de l’expérience de femmes civiles prises dans un
conflit armé : les dispositions générales contre la discrimination, la
protection spécifique aux femmes civiles contre la violence sexuelle
et la protection spécifique de femmes enceintes et de mères. On
conclut que quoiqu’un débat animé ait été tenu au sein de cercles
féministes en rapport avec la suffisance des dispositions existantes
du DIH, l’action principale a eu tendance à être concentrée sur
l’application de la loi. C’est malheureux, car cela signifie que
certaines intuitions quant à l’impact sur le conflit d’inégalités
profondes entre les sexes demeurent en grande partie inexplorées.
I. INTRODUCTION
International humanitarian law [IHL] provisions address the situation of civilian women caught in armed conflict today, but is this law enough? A number
of feminist lawyers have considered this question over the past fifteen years and
have come to differing, sometimes starkly opposite, conclusions. This article
considers the resulting debate as to whether the female-specific IHL provisions
are adequate but underenforced, or inadequate, outdated and in need of revision. For example, one school of thought argues that “[i]f women have to bear
so many of the tragic effects of armed conflict, it is not primarily because of any
shortcomings in the rules protecting them, but because these rules are all too
often not observed.”1 For the advocates of this approach, which this article will
refer to as the “enforcement” school, the main impediment to the protection
of female civilians during hostilities is lack of observance of IHL. This view is
widely reflected in the work of the United Nations on the issue of women and
war today.2 For example, Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace
and security calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully IHL as it applies to the rights and protection of women and girls, but does not question the
suitability of IHL to addressing these needs.3
A second school of thought believes that this lack of questioning of IHL is a
mistake. While proponents of this view agree that it would be helpful to civilian
women if IHL was more consistently enforced, they also argue that mostly there

1

2

3

Charlotte Lindsey, “Women and War – An Overview” (2000) 839 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 561
at 579 [Lindsey, “Overview”]. This is also the view of the International Committee of the
Red Cross: “On the whole, public international law (in particular IHL, human rights law and
refugee law) adequately addresses the needs of women in all of these situations. The challenge
lies in translating the law into practice by ensuring implementation of and respect for the
existing rules.” International Committee of the Red Cross, “Addressing the Needs of Women
Affected by Armed Conflict: An ICRC Guidance Document” (Geneva: ICRC, 2004) at 9.
Judith Gardam, “Women and Armed Conflict: The Response of International Humanitarian
Law” in Helen Durham and Tracey Gurd, eds., Listening to the Silences: Women and War
(Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at 114-116 [Gardam, “Response”].
Women and peace and security, UN SCOR, 4213th Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1325 (2000) at
para. 9.
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are no provisions of IHL that truly address the female experience, so enforcement is not the main issue.4 Thus, something more fundamental is needed to
meet the goal of more fully protecting civilian women: reconceptualization and
revision of IHL.5 They see current IHL as a reflection of masculine assumptions
that do not take into account global systematic gender inequality.6 This will
be referred to as the “revision” school of thought. There are, however, points
of agreement: both views express frustration at the lack of action in alleviating
women’s suffering during armed conflict, and both acknowledge the diverse horrors suffered by women during and after armed conflict.7
This article examines the state of the feminist debate since the mid-1990s
within three areas of IHL considered by many to be central legal aspects of
the experience of female civilians caught in armed conflict: the general nondiscrimination provisions within IHL, the specific protections for civilian
women against sexual violence and the specific protection of pregnant women
and mothers.8 It concludes that, while there has been a vibrant debate within
feminist international legal circles on the adequacy of existing IHL provisions,
mainstream action has tended to focus on enforcement. This seeming marginalization of feminist calls for reconceptualizing and revising IHL is unfortunate,
as it means that the “revision” school’s insights into the impact of deep gender
inequalities on conflict have largely been left unexplored. This article argues that
a combination of continual scrutiny, better enforcement, further (re)interpretation and law reform of IHL are all useful strategies for improving the situation
of female civilians in armed conflict.
II. GENERAL Non-discrimination Provisions within IHL
A number of provisions within the Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols state that protected persons are to be treated similarly and without any
adverse distinction founded on, among other categories, sex.9 This principle of

4
5

6
7
8

9

Gardam, “Response”, supra note 2 at 123.
For example, UNIFEM has called upon the United Nations Secretary-General to “appoint
a panel of experts to assess the gaps in international and national laws and standards
pertaining to the protection of women in conflict and post-conflict situations and women’s
role in peacebuilding:” Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Women, War & Peace: The
Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in
Peacebuilding (New York: UNIFEM, 2002) at 140.
Judith G. Gardam and Michelle J. Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict and International Law (Boston:
Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 93 [Gardam and Jarvis, Women].
Helen Durham, Review of Women, Armed Conflict and International Law, by Judith G. Gardam
and Michelle J. Jarvis (2002) 847 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 655 at 659 [Durham, “Book Review”].
These categories of IHL provisions are chosen to be illustrative. Other categories also apply to
or have a significant impact upon civilian women, such as rules governing women as civilian
internees, general rules on the conduct of hostilities and rules on weapons.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS (1950) 31 [entered into force 21 October 1950] at
art. 12 [First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS
(1950) 85 [entered into force 21 October 1950] at art. 12 [Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS (1950)
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“no adverse distinction” is a central principle within IHL. The notion of “adverse
distinction” implies that “while discrimination between persons is prohibited, a
distinction may be made to give priority to those in most urgent need of care.”10
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], these provisions have entered customary international law, such that adverse distinction
in the application of international humanitarian law based on sex and other
similar criteria is prohibited.11 This rule of customary international law applies
in both international and non-international armed conflicts.12 The “no adverse
distinction” provisions are IHL’s equivalent of international human rights law’s
principle of non-discrimination.13
The “enforcement” school of thought argues that the centrality of the “no
adverse distinction” rule is an illustration that IHL is based upon equality of
protection.14 Thus, both female and male civilians are clearly entitled to the
same protections under IHL.15 Under this approach, IHL is not seen to contain any specific structural legal bias that disadvantages women. There is acknowledgement that, for many women, war can mean “violence, fear, loss of
loved ones, deprivation of livelihood, sexual violence, abandonment, increased
responsibility for family members, detention, displacement, physical injury,
and sometimes death.”16 War can also force women into unfamiliar roles and
require them to strengthen existing coping skills or develop new such skills.17
While many women may suffer specific vulnerabilities during armed conflict,
the ICRC has indicated that women should not be seen as a homogenous group,

10
11
12
13
14

15

16
17

135 [entered into force 21 October 1950] at art. 16 (art. 16 does not mention sex in the
no adverse distinction list, but has a basket clause into which “sex” would fall: “or any other
distinction founded on similar criteria”) [Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS (1950) 287
[entered into force 21 October 1950] at art. 27 (again, this list does not include sex, but the
list is an open one) [Fourth Geneva Convention]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 12
December 1977, 1125 UNTS (1979) 3 at arts. 9 and 75 [Additional Protocol I]; and Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-international Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS (1979) 609 at art. 2
[Additional Protocol II].
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law,
Vol. 1: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 309.
The other similar criteria include race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status: Ibid. at 308.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 309.
Helen Durham, “International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Women” in Helen
Durham and Tracey Gurd, eds., supra note 2 at 97 [Durham, “Protection”]. See also International
Committee of the Red Cross, Women and War (Geneva: ICRC, 2008) at 2: “Women benefit
from the general protection afforded by IHL. Along with the rest of the protected population,
they must be able to live free from intimidation and abuse.” [ICRC, Women and War]
Durham, ibid. at 97; Women, Peace and Security: Study Submitted by the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) (New York: United Nations, 2002) at para.
119.
ICRC, Women and War, supra note 14 at 2.
Ibid.
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as they experience war in a multitude of ways.18 Women should not be categorized as helpless victims: “On a daily basis in conflicts around the globe, women
demonstrate their resilience by caring for family members and by holding communities together.”19 Thus, one should not jump to the conclusion that women
are always the most vulnerable in all armed conflicts20 and therefore to a second
conclusion that women always require some form of distinction. An analysis of
a given armed conflict may indicate that female and male civilians are subject to
differing risks: in one situation, men may be at higher risk for killing, detention
or disappearance, while women may be targeted for sexual violence.21 This may
not hold true for another situation. This school of thought does acknowledge,
however, that there are circumstances where preferential or beneficial distinction
in favour of a group (such as women) is permissible and needed.22
The “revision” school of thought posits that, while the “no adverse distinction”
provisions may apply to all civilians and, in theory, provide equal protections to
women and men, this is not the case in reality: “[a]lthough IHL is based on a
system of formal equality, the limits of such an approach for achieving substantive equality for women are well documented.”23 The absence of gender bias in
the letter of the law cannot guarantee that the application of the discrimination
principle protects women’s interests de facto in the same manner or to the same
extent that it protects men’s interests: “[a] norm can be formally gender-neutral
but gendered in conception and gender-biased in practice.”24 Formal equality
does not work in this case, according to Judith Gardam and Michelle Jarvis,
because the norm on which this equality is based is not neutral – it is masculine and therefore inherently discriminatory.25 This masculine norm operates
on a false assumption, “namely, that apart from their role as mothers and in the
context of sexual violence, women not only share the same experience of armed
conflict as other members of the population but are able to avail themselves
equally of the existing provisions offered by IHL.”26
Gardam and Jarvis argue that IHL does not recognize that armed conflict has
fundamentally different impacts upon civilian men and women and that these
differing impacts stem from systematic gender inequality at the heart of virtually
all societies.27 Without this recognition, IHL reinforces and exacerbates endemic
discrimination against women by failing to address their actual needs.28 “In a
world where women are not equals of men … a general category of rules that

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. at 3: “Women are often portrayed as helpless victims and as a particularly vulnerable group
in situations of armed conflict. However, women are not vulnerable as such.”
21 Ibid.
22 Durham, “Protection”, supra note 14 at 97-98.
23 Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 93.
24 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, “Questioning Civilian Immunity” (2008) 43 Tex. Int’l L.J. 453 at
477.
25 Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 93.
26 Gardam, “Response”, supra note 2 at 120.
27 Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 93 and 97.
28 Ibid. at 94.
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is not inclusive of the reality for women cannot respond to their situation.”29
Thus, apart from certain special protections - for example, as pregnant women,
mothers of young children and women at risk of sexual violence30 - women are
largely invisible to IHL.31 This group argues that IHL must be reexamined in
light of systematic inequality, and that this examination may require that IHL
be reinterpreted, expanded or rewritten to better address the needs of female
civilians.32
The “enforcement” school of thought responds to this criticism in two ways.
First, it protests that the “revision” school expects too much of IHL. The “enforcement” proponents argue that IHL, as lex specialis, is extremely restricted
in its aims, focusing on survival for as many people as possible during the most
extreme circumstances a society can experience.33 Within this very limited and
pragmatic approach, “international humanitarian law makes no claim to deal
with the basis of social structure in general.”34 This narrow mandate “accounts
for the successes of international humanitarian law (and there are many) and lies
at the heart of this whole legal regime.”35 Thus, there is simply no room in IHL
for social analysis of systematic gender inequality: “to do so would draw it into a
quagmire of moral and ethical argument which would render its rules useless.”36
However, the “limitations of international humanitarian law and the need for it
to avoid inherently questioning a society are complex and require further examination and debate.”37
Second, the “enforcement” school of thought also counters that IHL is not
solely focused on formal equality, to the exclusion of substantive equality. According to Françoise Krill, “equality could easily be transformed into injustice if
it were to be applied to situations which are inherently unequal and without taking into account circumstances relating to the state of health, the age and the sex
of protected persons.”38 A similar observation was made in the ICRC Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention.39 These proponents point to the recognition of the special needs of pregnant women, mothers of young children and
women at risk of sexual violence as clear examples of where IHL has adjusted the
law to ensure a practical response to the needs of different individuals.40
IHL’s “no adverse distinction” provisions are placed within a much wider context by both schools of thought. The “enforcement” school sees these provisions

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Ibid. at 93.
These special protections are explored infra.
Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 94.
Ibid. at 254-263.
Durham, “Protection”, supra note 14 at 97.
Durham, “Book Review”, supra note 7 at 657.
Ibid.
Durham, “Protection”, supra note 14 at 97; Durham, “Book Review”, supra note 7 at 658.
Durham, “Book Review”, supra note 7 at 658.
Françoise Krill, “The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law” (1985) 249
Int’l Rev. Red Cross 337 at 339.
39 Jean S. Pictet, ed., Commentary: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Vol. IV (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958) at 206.
40 Durham, “Protection”, supra note 14 at 99.
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as of central importance for the protection of female civilians within IHL. The
“revision” school questions whether they can be considered central, given that
they are based upon the faulty assumption that similarity in treatment results in
equality of experience as between men and women. This latter school of thought
argues that this assumption does not take into account that women’s experience is largely more oppressed than that of men’s, as a result of pervasive, global
gender-based discrimination, and that IHL must and can take this into account.
The two schools of thought therefore have radically different starting points.
The approach of each school also raises questions that have not been adequately tackled, in this author’s view. The “enforcement” school’s argument that
the narrow mandate of IHL excludes the ability to take into account systematic
gender inequality raises two questions: first, would focusing on women as societally unequal within that narrow mandate actually undermine rather than
enhance the law’s goal of improving the chances of survival of armed conflict?
It appears that the answer is “no,” insofar as the type of analysis the “revision”
school of thought seems to be calling for is a wider, deeper and more integrated
version the ICRC’s analysis of vulnerabilities. This vulnerabilities analysis has
already proven to be useful in identifying the needs of many female civilians in
war, and it does not follow that an expanded analysis would do the opposite.
Second, the “enforcement” school of thought does not sufficiently explain why
the integration of social analysis of endemic discrimination would draw IHL
“into a quagmire of moral and ethical argument which would render its rules
useless.”41 The fear appears to be that bringing feminist social analysis into IHL
would open IHL rules up to dismissal by those who are expected to apply them
because the rules themselves would question underlying beliefs of those carrying
out the armed conflict. However, it is not clear how this concern differs from the
concern that combatants will not follow IHL rules for other reasons, or why the
“quagmire” could not be adequately overcome by an enhanced vulnerabilities
analysis.
Similarly, the “revision” school of thought has not drawn out as clearly as it
could have the aspects of truth to the “quagmire.” Bringing a feminist analysis
of endemic discrimination into IHL will only be able to correct IHL as much as
a similar analysis is able to correct international law more generally.42 Liesbeth
Lijnzaad has elaborated on the dilemma for IHL. She points out that “armed
conflict tends to aggravate and magnify pre-existing inequalities in society” and
“[c]onsequently, if in society the legal protection of women is gendered and thus
insufficient, it is to a certain extent not surprising that the situation of women
in armed conflict will be worrying.”43 She concludes that “[i]t would be, after
all, unrealistic to expect the protection during armed conflict to be fully taking
into account gender issues when this has not been realized in society even during

41 Ibid. at 97; Durham, “Book Review”, supra note 7 at 658.
42 This analysis is, indeed, needed and Charlesworth and Chinkin have begun it: Hilary
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
43 Liesbeth Lijnzaad, Book Review of Women, Armed Conflict and International Law by Judith G.
Gardam and Michelle J. Jarvis (2005) Nethl. Int’l L. Rev. 496 at 500.
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peace.”44 Having said this, Gardam in particular does recognize that the flaws
that she identifies within IHL are reflective of, and reflected by, flaws within
international law more generally, especially international human rights law.45
However, she feels that IHL is even more deficient.46
Despite this discussion of dramatically differing feminist responses to the general “no adverse distinction” provisions of IHL, there does appear to be common
ground. This common ground is more evident within the “enforcement” and
“revision” discussions of how IHL addresses civilian women at risk of sexual violence during conflict and the needs of pregnant women and women with young
children. Each of these discussions issues is explored in turn.
III. SPECIFIC Protections within IHL for Civilian Women
Against Sexual Violence
IHL contains few express references to sexual violence committed during
armed conflict. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that “women
shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”47 Article 75
of Additional Protocol I prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault.”48 Article 76 states that “women shall be the object of special
respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and
any other form of indecent assault.”49 Similarly, Additional Protocol II adopts language prohibiting, with respect to non-international armed conflicts, “outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape,
enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”50
The “revision” school of thought has several serious concerns about the way
in which IHL addresses sexual violence. The first concern relates to the wording
and tenor of certain of the articles covering sexual violence in terms of honour
or dignity, rather than in terms of the severe physical and psychological impact
sexual violence has on an individual (male or female). This, Gardam and Jarvis
argue, is because these articles were constituted “on the basis of certain assumed
sexual attributes [of women], the characterizing features of which are chastity and
modesty.”51 In agreement, Bennoune notes that the Commentary to the Fourth

44 Ibid.
45 Judith Gardam, “Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the Silence?” (1997) 46
I.C.L.Q. 55 [Gardam, “Silence?”].
46 Ibid. While one response might be to supplement IHL with international human rights law,
Gardam also argues that international human rights law has limited ability to overcome the gaps
in IHL: Gardam, “Response”, supra note 2 at 122.
47 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 9 at art. 27.
48 Additional Protocol I, supra note 9 at art. 75. This provision was incorporated into the crimes
listed in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, UNSCOR
49th sess., 3453rd mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/955 (1994) at art. 4(e).
49 Ibid. at art. 76.
50 Additional Protocol II, supra note 9 at art. 4.
51 Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 97. See also Catherine N. Niarchos, “Women, War and
Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (1995) 17 Hum.
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Geneva Convention takes a somewhat enlightened approach to honour, defining
it as a moral and social quality invested in individuals, but that this approach
“did not supersede the discriminatory social norms at the time of drafting” and
grounded the rights of women to maintain bodily integrity in now “outdated
notions of chastity and virtue.”52 Rhonda Copelon argues that the conceptualization of sexual violence as an attack on honour is problematic because it “implies the loss of station or respect” and “reinforces the social view, internalized
by women, that the raped woman is dishonorable.”53 She also felt that, “while
the concept of dignity potentially embraces more profound concerns, standing
alone it obfuscates the fact that rape is fundamentally violence against women –
violence against her body, autonomy, integrity, security, and self-esteem as well
as her standing in the community.”54 The words of IHL do not fully capture the
harm done to victims of sexual violence, and they do not indicate that sexual violence “is a crime of the gravest dimension.”55 Similarly, Kelly Askin decries the
use of the terms “honour” and “dignity” as grossly mischaracterizing the offence,
diminishing the harm, perpetrating detrimental stereotypes and concealing the
nature of the crime.56 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin are troubled
that, by “designating rape as a crime against ‘honour’ rather than one of violence,
the provision [in the Fourth Geneva Convention] presents women as male and
family property.”57
This view is countered by the “enforcement” school, particularly by Charlotte
Lindsey and the ICRC. Lindsey states: “In recent years, some writers have voiced
concern about the use of the word “honour” in relation to sexual violence, in
that it fails to recognize the brutal nature of rape and uses instead a “value” term
to define the interest to be protected rather than the women herself, and for
embodying the notion of women as property.”58 She continues, the “honour – a
term which is also used in other articles of the Geneva Conventions and not only
in those pertaining to women – …[is] a code by which many men and women
are raised, define and lead their lives” and therefore “the concept of honour is
much more complex than merely a “value” term.”59 Therefore, “honour” may,
in a given society, indeed mean exactly what the commentators above argue it

52

53
54
55
56

57
58
59

Rts. Q. 671; and Judith Gardam, “Women, Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law” (1998) 324 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 421.
Karima Bennoune, “Do We Need New International Law to Protect Women in Armed
Conflict?” (2006-2007) 38 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 363 at 379. Gardam and Charlesworth
recognize this conception of honour in the Fourth Geneva Convention, but argue that it is
men’s honour that has the most complex understanding in IHL: Judith Gardam and Hilary
Charlesworth, “Protecting Women in Armed Conflict” (2000) 22 Hum. Rts. Q 148 at 159.
Rhonda Copelon, “Surfacing Gender: Re-engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian
Law” (1994) 5 Hastings Women’s L. J. 243 at 249.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 249.
Kelly D. Askin, “Women and International Humanitarian Law” in Kelly D. Askin and Dorean
Koenig, eds., Women and International Human Rights Law, Vol. 1 (New York: Transnational
Publishers, Inc., 1999) at 55 [Askin, IHL].
Charlesworth and Chinkin, supra note 42 at 314.
Lindsey, “Overview”, supra note 1 at 576.
Ibid.
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should not: “In many societies the concept of womanhood is embodied by a
woman’s purity and chastity if she is married or by her monogamous relationship
with her husband if she is married.”60 In these circumstances, the ICRC points
out that the “honour” of women may be targeted during armed conflict as a
means of attacking the enemy, and thus rape may be considered as dishonouring
the victim, her family and community.61 The ICRC does recognize, however,
that it is the perpetrator of sexual violence who is dishonoured, rather than the
victim or her family.62 Lindsey admits that the concerns expressed by those associated with the “revision” school of thought are valid to a certain extent because
of IHL’s archaic language, but argues that, even so, honour is part of a binding
legal norm protecting civilian women that is still of resonance today.63
The second concern of the “revision” school of thought is also terminological: the provisions relating directly to women focus on their protection, as opposed to explicitly prohibiting listed offences. Charlesworth, Chinkin and Gardam argue that this language creates a protector/protected dichotomy, which
reinforces gendered assumptions of men as fighters and women as victims who
must be protected by fighters.64 This then obscures the issue of whether sexual
violence is prohibited. Quénivet counters with three points. First, she strongly
argues that the word “protection” must be interpreted as encompassing within
IHL both prohibition and prevention, and that this is consistent with other approaches to the word in international law.65 Second, as the aim of the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols is to offer protection to certain categories
of persons, then the relevant provisions “must be understood as offering women
an unconditional protection from rape, i.e., rape is prohibited via the protection
formula.”66 Third, article 75 of Additional Protocol I and article 4 of Additional
Protocol II explicitly prohibit certain forms of sexual violence and this explicit
proscription must be considered when interpreting article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.67 Durham, Askin and others agree that the protection language
translates into a prohibition of sexual violence during international and noninternational armed conflict.68 Here it seems that both schools of thought are

60
61
62
63
64

65
66
67
68

International Committee of the Red Cross, Women Facing War (Geneva: ICRC, 2001) at 55.
Ibid. at 55-56.
Ibid. at 64.
Lindsey, “Overview” supra note 1 at 576-577; Charlotte Lindsey, “The Impact of Armed
Conflict on Women” in Durham and Gurd, supra note 2 at 33 [Lindsey, “Impact”].
Charlesworth and Chinkin, supra note 42 at 314; Judith Gardam, “Gender and Non-Combatant
Immunity” (1993) 3 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 345 at 358, on the protector/protected
relationship [Gardam, “Non-Combatant”]; Gardam, “Silence?”, supra note 45 at 57; Helen M.
Kinsella, “Securing the Civilian: Sex and Gender in the Laws of War” in Michael Barnett and
Raymond Duvall, eds., Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004) at 255.
Noëlle N.R. Quénivet, Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict & International Law (Ardsley, New
York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2005) at 87-91.
Ibid. at 93.
Ibid. at 94 (presumably this would include art. 76 of Additional Protocol I).
Durham, “Protection”, supra note 14 at 98; Askin, IHL, supra note 55 at 55 (Askin notes that
the prohibition is “primitively characterized”).

Vol. 27(2)

Feminist Debates

395

in agreement: despite the use of protection language, IHL does prohibit sexual
violence. However, there is a divergence insofar as, to those in the “revision”
school, the issue is not whether rape is technically a crime prohibited in war, but
whether sexual violence is properly understood as an extremely serious crime.69
The third concern of the “revision” school of thought is the lack of breadth of
the IHL provisions. Generally, the concern is that women and girls suffer many
kinds of sexual violence during armed conflict and the few references within
IHL to rape and enforced prostitution do not capture, and therefore name, this
diversity of crimes. Initially, this concern was expressed through arguments for
rape and other forms of sexual violence to be recognized as grave breaches.70
However, this concern has diminished over time as the ICRC recognized that
the grave breach of “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health” found in article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention covers rape71 and
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia also recognized
that sexual violence can amount to a grave breach.72 Thus, the concern shifted
to a desire for a more fulsome recognition of different kinds of sexual violence.
For example, while the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court includes
the war crimes of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization and other comparable forms of sexual violence73 Askin has
noted other acts that include an aspect of sexual violence that have yet to be directly identified as war crimes: forced nudity, sexual mutilation, forced marriage
and forced abortion.74 It is also important to recognize that a fulsome listing of
sexual violence war crimes does not necessarily capture non-sexual gender-based
war crimes, or war crimes with both sexual and non-sexual aspects.75
There is, however, a meeting of minds between the two schools of thought
with respect to the expansion of IHL’s understanding of war crimes. Both schools
of thought welcome the fact that the limited express references to sexual violence
within IHL treaties have been supplemented over the past fifteen years by the
Statutes and judgments of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Internation-

69 Copelon, supra note 53 at 248-249.
70 See e.g. ibid. at 250 and Gardam and Jarvis, Women, supra note 6 at 74.
71 ICRC Aide-Mémoire (3 Dec. 1992) cited in Theodor Meron, “Rape as a Crime Under
International Humanitarian Law” (1993) 87 A.J.I.L. 424 at n. 20.
72 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (10 Dec. 1998) at para. 172
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber) [Furundžija].
73 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 ILM 1002
(1998) [entered into force 1 July 2002] at art. 8(2)(b) (xxii) and 8(2)(e) (vi).
74 Kelly D. Askin, “The Jurisprudence of the International War Crimes Tribunals: Securing
Gender Justice for Some Survivors” in Durham and Gurd, supra note 2 at 147-151 [Askin,
“Jurisprudence”].
75 One such example could be the crime of forced marriage, in which individuals are assigned as
“spouses” without consent and are expected to undertake sex on demand, household chores and
other forced labour. While recognized as a crimes against humanity by the Special Court for
Sierra Leone in Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et al., SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (2 Mar. 2009)
at paras. 1465-1473 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber) [Sesay], forced marriage
could conceivably also be identified as a war crime.
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al Criminal Court.76 Even so, de Londras points out, and the advocates of the
“revision” school would likely agree, that these advances are only “a partial and
distinctly positivistic success” that have not always translated into investigations,
prosecutions or convictions.77
IV. SPECIFIC Protection of Pregnant Women and
Mothers of Young Children
Another area where the two schools of thought adopt differing points of
view is in respect to IHL’s provisions regarding civilian pregnant women and
mothers of young children. Article 38 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides
that pregnant women and mothers of children under seven years of age shall be
granted preferential treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State
concerned.78 Article 50 of the same Convention indicates that the Occupying
Power shall not hinder the application of preferential measures adopted prior
to the occupation with respect to expectant mothers and mothers of children
under seven years.79 Parties to the conflict can also create hospital and safety
zones to protect, inter alia, expectant mothers and mothers of children under
seven.80 Article 89 requires that interned pregnant and nursing mothers be given
additional food “in proportion to their physiological needs.”81 Under the same
Convention, parties to the conflict are to conclude agreements for the release,
repatriation, return or accommodation in a neutral country of interned civilians who are pregnant or mothers with infants and young children.82 In both
the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I, pregnant women and
nursing mothers are given priority in humanitarian relief.83 Additional Protocol I
includes pregnant women and newborn babies within the protections provided
for wounded and sick.84 Other relevant provisions include art. 76 of Additional
Protocol I, under which arrested, detained or interned civilian pregnant women
and mothers of dependent infants must have their cases considered with the
utmost priority, and the death penalty shall not be executed for these women.85
The “enforcement” school of thought believes that these provisions reflect
pragmatic protections necessary for pregnant women and women with young

76 Durham, “Protection”, supra note 14 at 99; Anne-Marie L.M. de Brouwer, Supranational
Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and ICTR (Oxford:
Intersentia, 2005) at 220-223; Quénivet, supra note 65 at 111.
77 Fiona de Londras, “Prosecuting Sexual Violence in the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals
for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia”, University College Dublin Working Papers in Law,
Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 06/2009 in Martha Fineman, ed.,
Transcending the Boundaries of Law (Routledge, forthcoming 2010) at 5 and 15.
78 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 9 at art. 38.
79 Ibid. at art. 50.
80 Ibid. at art. 14.
81 Ibid. at art. 89.
82 Ibid. at art. 132.
83 Ibid. at art. 23.
84 Additional Protocol I, supra note 9 at art. 8.
85 Ibid. at art. 76. A similar death penalty provision is found in Additional Protocol II, supra note
9 at art. 6.
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children caught in armed conflict. In this regard, IHL recognizes that, in numerous societies around the world, women are required during armed conflict to
protect and care for vulnerable elements of the population, including children,
or they may be pregnant themselves.86 These caregiving and reproductive roles
are made difficult by armed conflict.87 Thus, the system of protection of pregnant
women and mothers of young children could, if implemented, “undoubtedly
contribute toward a decrease in the suffering women endure during conflict.”88
The “revision” school of thought does not take issue with the provisions per se,
but argues that the regime of special protection, of which these provisions play
a large part, “reveals a picture of women that is drawn exclusively on the basis
of their perceived weakness, both physical and psychological, and their sexual
and reproductive functions.”89 Gardam and Jarvis note that, of the 42 provisions of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols that specifically deal
with women, 19 concern women as expectant mothers, maternity cases or nursing mothers.90 They are concerned that this characterization identifies women
only in connection with an ‘other’– an unborn child or young children – rather
than providing rights or protections in civilian women’s own right. They further
describe how the protection of the unborn child and small children was the
rationale for the inclusion of these provisions, which is why women are referred
to in their reproductive and mothering roles.91 Charlesworth and Chinkin argue
that this approach “reduces the status of women without children.”92 Bennoune
indicates that there is concern that the strong focus on pregnant women and
mothers with young children within IHL may infantalize women by equating
women with children.93 As well, she indicates that the focus on protecting future
generations through rules about pregnant women may inadvertently “instrumentalize” women and their bodies.94
In addition, the “revision” school of thought is worried that the IHL provisions
largely represent a biological (sex-based), rather than sociological (gendered),
category of individual who needs certain protections, even when it is more likely
that female gender, as a socially-constructed category, leads to vulnerability.95 In
this respect, Gardam lauds the ICRC for recognizing socially constructed gender as a factor in the way that women experience armed conflict, but expresses
the view that the ICRC considers women in two distinct categories: biological
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Durham, “Protection”, supra note 14 at 99.
Ibid.
Bennoune, supra note 52 at 377.
Gardam and Jarvis, Women, supra note 6 at 95.
Ibid. at 96.
Ibid.
Charlesworth and Chinkin, supra note 42 at 315.
Bennoune, supra note 52 at 377.
Ibid.
Otto expresses a similar concern with respect to the manner in which Security Council
resolution 1325 on women, peace and security is engaged, for example by “deploying gender as
a biological category and reducing its transformative vision to a set of bureaucratic techniques
and measurements.” Dianne Otto, “A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in
the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325” (2006-2007) 13 Mich. J. Gender &
L. 113 at 173.
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women and gendered women.96 She argues that the ICRC’s category of biological woman is a misnomer because it, too, is actually socially constructed: “[t]here
is no such entity as the pre-ordained wom[a]n with her special needs.”97 While
Gardam explores the example of privacy as a socially-constructed rather than
biological “need” for women, one can see Gardam’s point in another illustration:
being biologically female does not necessarily mean a person will be a primary
caregiver to children under seven years. Rather, this is likely to be determined by
socially constructed gender norms as to who usually cares for young children.
In sum, the IHL provisions providing specific protections for pregnant women and mothers of young children are viewed by the “enforcement” school of
thought as necessary expressions of the reproductive and caregiving roles undertaken by some women. The “revision” school of thought does not take issue with
the provisions in and of themselves, but is concerned with how these provisions
seem to relate to women only in their roles as mothers. In other words, they are
concerned that IHL largely does not see, and therefore does not address, civilian
women in other roles.
V. Common Ground in the Approaches of the Two
Schools
This article has largely outlined points of disagreement between the “enforcement” and “revision” schools of thought on female-specific IHL provisions.
The first school of thought largely feels that IHL addresses the needs of civilian
women caught in war, but that more enforcement of IHL is needed. The second school of thought agrees that greater enforcement of IHL rules is necessary,
but feels that there is a deeper problem: the provisions of IHL are inherently
discriminatory and no amount of enforcement can overcome this fundamental
flaw in the system.98 While the two schools do not sit easily together,99 there is
agreement that the general aim of both sides is the same: to reduce the suffering of women in armed conflict.100 Both schools also agree that the protection
of women under IHL must be accompanied by complementary protection of
women under international human rights and refugee law.101
Both schools also stress that civilian women should not be thought of primarily, or only, as victims of armed conflict. Their experiences are much more
multifaceted. The ICRC, Lindsey, and Gardam and Jarvis have all made this
point in detail.102 For example, women in war may suffer from being targeted by
male combatants or in particular attacks for violence and intimidation, or from
lack of access to necessities of life, but they are also resilient and resourceful in
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Gardam, “Response”, supra note 2 at 118.
Ibid.
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See, for example, Askin, IHL, supra note 56 at 61-62; Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 123
and 254-255; ICRC, Women Facing War, supra note 60 at 22-23.
102 ICRC, Women Facing War, supra note 60 at 28-30; Lindsey, “Impact”, supra note 63 at 22;
Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 21-48.
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trying to provide for their families and themselves.103 In other words, women
should not be viewed as passive victims; their situation and coping abilities demand a more complex understanding of their situation. In a similar vein, both
approaches understand that one of the ways in which women’s experience of
war differs from that of men is that they are at greater risk of being subjected to
sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery and sexual mutilation, and genderbased violence such as forced marriage.104 As discussed above, both approaches
also recognize that international and internationalized criminal tribunals have
significantly advanced IHL’s understanding of certain war crimes, such as rape.
Both schools agree that that there are areas of IHL that need development.
Despite their different starting points and conclusions, both schools accept that
there are aspects of IHL that can be further added to or revised to better address
the situation of civilian women during wartime. Durham points to the regulations placed upon warring parties during non-international armed conflict, an
area also identified by Gardam and Jarvis.105 Durham also points to the need for
international criminal tribunals to address in more detail how the conduct of
hostilities affects female (and male) civilians, a point Gardam also raises.106
Finally, both schools of thought have issued calls to action. Durham asks all
who strive to give women increased protection during times of armed conflict
– theorists and practitioners, academics and operational personnel – to work
together to find solutions.107 Similarly, but more specifically, Gardam, Charlesworth and others have proposed various actions, from the negotiation of a new
IHL or international human rights law treaty or protocol, to the adoption of
new, overarching “soft law” principles on women in armed conflict, to updating the Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, to
the creation of a Centre of Expertise on Gender Issues and Armed Conflict.108
Some have reasoned that certain actions become less needed as time goes on. For
example, Copelon has argued that “[p]rosecuting rape as a grave breach should
effectively expand the meaning of the Conventions and Protocols and obviate
the need for formal amendment.”109 Gardam has put forward the view that the
gender-sensitive interpretation of sexual violence crimes by international criminal tribunals actually opens up the possibility of further gender-sensitive interpretations of IHL, for example on indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian
population.110
There are also those who argue for action combining the two schools of

103 ICRC, Women and War, supra note 14 at 2-3.
104 ICRC, Women Facing War, supra note 60 at 51; Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 25; Askin,
“Jurisprudence”, supra note 74 at 149-150.
105 Durham, “Protection”, supra note 14 at 107; Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 122.
106 Durham, “Protection”, supra note 14 at 107; Gardam, “Response”, supra note 2 at 123.
107 Durham, Book Review, supra note 7 at 659.
108 Gardam and Jarvis, supra note 6 at 254-263; Gardam and Charlesworth, supra note 52 at
163-166; Bennoune, supra note 52 at 387-390 summarizes the various proposed initiatives in
detail.
109 Copelon, supra note 53 at 254.
110 Judith Gardam, “The Neglected Aspect of Women and Armed Conflict – Progressive
Development of the Law” (2005) Nethl. Int’l. L. Rev. 197 at 219 [Gardam, “Neglected”].
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thought. For example, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, including its Causes and Consequences, has taken a middle ground by focusing
largely on the need for enforcement of existing norms, while also recommending
that the 1949 Geneva Conventions should be “re-examined and re-evaluated so as
to incorporate developing norms against women during armed conflict.”111 Bennoune has recommended utilizing the advances in international human rights
law with respect to women’s rights to create a better approach, since “creatively
patching together interpretations of texts to find space for women’s experiences
of war may not ultimately be enough.”112 She also encourages balancing this
work with “significant emphasis on full and universal implementation of existing
technical rules of IHL.”113
This author believes that the way forward is to work within the middle
ground. The points of agreement identified throughout this article provide the
space in which dialogue can take place between proponents of the two schools,
and within the wider IHL community. The “enforcement” school of thought
has set out the virtues of the existing IHL insofar as it addresses certain needs of
civilian women caught in hostilities. The “revision” school has critiqued IHL so
as to reveal its many weaknesses. The back-and-forth between the two schools
has sharpened the analysis of both sides. These criticisms and virtues, strengths
and weaknesses identified by each should not be resisted by the other, nor should
this discussion be seen as simply a feminist debate on the margins of “real” IHL
analysis. The school of thought inclined toward revision of IHL helps to add a
critical edge to the overall understanding of how IHL can and cannot help and
empower female civilians. The school of thought focused on enforcement of the
existing law helps to ground the discussion in of-the-moment application of
IHL.
Having said this, it appears that the “enforcement” side of debate has had
somewhat more success in entering mainstream discussions of IHL over the past
fifteen years. This is, it seems, because it is conceptually and politically easier
for mainstream actors such as states to focus upon existing law, rather than the
realization of new law to address deep-rooted inequalities. As Gardam has noted,
there “is consensus that this is not the ideal time politically to mount a challenge
to IHL.”114 Even so, there are signs that the important issues raised within the
“revision” school may yet be considered within the mainstream. For example,
international criminal tribunals have adjudicated the war crime of rape in a
number of cases and, in so doing, have contributed to the enforcement of this
law.115 In addition, in analyzing rape as a violation of IHL, international criminal

111 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998) at 22. On the need for enforcement of existing norms, see:
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73 (2001) at para. 66.
112 Bennoune, supra note 52 at 387 and 390.
113 Ibid.
114 Gardam, “Neglected”, supra note 110 at 216.
115 E.g. Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al., IT-96-21-T, Judgment (16 Nov. 1998) at 450-451 (counts
18-10, 21-23) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber).
This judgment elaborated on rape as a war crime through the rubric of torture and cruel
treatment.
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tribunals have provided more detail on and enlarged its content,116 viewed as
helpful by both schools of thought.117 For example, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone recently introduced intersectional analysis of the interlinkages between
extreme forms of sexual violence directed against civilian women (and men) and
the war crime of committing acts of terrorism.118 However, these advances still
leave untouched the non-crime aspects of female-specific IHL.
Similarly, Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security have
tended to focus on the need for greater enforcement of IHL.119 However, recently, Security Council resolution 1888 (2009) has provided a potentially exciting
venue through which IHL might begin to be reconceptualized to better reflect
the entirety of the female experience of conflict. Resolution 1888 authorizes
the creation of a new United Nations Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on Women, Peace and Security, working with the inter-agency initiative
United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict.120 This partnership
could bring new, and focused, attention to the weaknesses of IHL identified by
the “revision” school and could influence the development of soft law on the
criminalization of IHL violations directed at, or especially affecting, female civilians during war. As Lijnzaad has noted, “[i]t will probably take a broad range
of steps, both of a normative character and of a practical nature to deal with
gender bias in humanitarian law.”121 The work of the new Special Representative
could be an important step in this process and, despite the consensus against
challenging IHL noted by Gardam, it may result in “an initiative in the context
of women and armed conflict that would allow improved, carefully targeted
protections for them in such times.”122
VI. Conclusion
IHL literature reveals a rich discussion over the past fifteen years within femi-

116 E.g., by setting out the elements of crime of rape (applicable both within the context of the
violation of IHL, and in the context of the international crimes of genocide and crimes against
humanity): Furundžija, supra note 72 at para. 185; Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-964-T, Judgment (2 Sept. 1998) at para. 598 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial
Chamber); and Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., IT-96-23-T & 1-T, Judgment (22 Feb.
2001) at para. 460 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber).
Note, however, that different judgments have adopted different elements, which has prompted
a lively discussion within international criminal law circles of the merits of different definitions.
See, e.g., de Brouwer, supra note 76 at 120-124; Wolfgang Schomburg and Ines Peterson,
“Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence Under International Criminal Law” (2007) 101 A.J.I.L.
121 at 124; Karen Engle, “Feminism and its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina” (2005) 99 A.J.I.L. 778 at 804.
117 Supra note 76.
118 Sesay, supra note 75 at paras. 1347-1355. The Appeals Chamber concurred with this approach:
Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et al., SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (26 Oct. 2009) at para. 990
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber).
119 Women and peace and security, supra note 3 at para. 9; Women and peace and security,
UN SCOR, 6195th Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1888 (2009) at preambular para. 6 and para. 7
[Resolution 1888 (2009)].
120 This position is to be created pursuant to Resolution 1888 (2009), supra note 119 at para. 4.
121 Lijnzaad, supra note 43 at 497.
122 Gardam, “Neglected”, supra note 110 at 217.
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nist circles on the adequacy, or not, of various provisions addressing civilian
women in armed conflict. It is unlikely that there is any one approach that will
resolve the tensions between the two schools of thought identified above. Each
school has a fundamentally different approach to IHL provisions governing the
treatment of civilian women. One school prioritizes better enforcement of existing IHL as crucial to improving the situation of civilian women,123 while the
other school of thought believes that IHL itself must be reopened, reinterpreted
or revised to eliminate inherent gender bias. The “enforcement” school feels that
the “revision” school does not pay enough attention to the successes placed on
limiting the means and methods of warfare, while the “revision” school believes
that not enough attention is paid within the international community to the
question of whether there are better alternatives to existing IHL.124 It is understandable that the ICRC (and its proponents) would take the view that enforcement, rather than revision, of IHL is preferred. The ICRC has a job to do
- protect people - and its tools are the existing laws. It is also understandable why
commentators such as Gardam decry the masculinity of IHL: IHL is law largely
written by men largely about male soldiers fighting wars.
However, we must not lose sight of the fact that “IHL remains a touchstone,
a source to which governments, national courts, and international courts and
mechanisms will always return.”125 Therefore, what IHL says about women in
war remains and will continue to remain significant.126 Both schools of thought
raise important issues. If IHL as it exists at the moment was fully enforced,
surely the situation of civilian women caught in armed conflicts would improve.
However, even in this best case scenario, IHL still would not address the underlying inequality of women that significantly and negatively contributes to
the way in which they experience war. Thus, the insights and prescriptions of
the “revision” school should not be ignored. Perhaps a deeper, more nuanced
version of the vulnerabilities analysis that takes into account systematic gender
inequality could be adopted by, for example, the ICRC as an initial step toward
the middle ground between the schools. In addition, the new United Nations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security
working with the inter-agency initiative United Nations Action Against Sexual
Violence in Conflict could work to strengthen - at least - soft law in such a way
that it acknowledges the multilayered impact of deep-rooted societal inequality
on female civilians in the application of IHL. The debate should continue both
within and especially outside of feminist circles in order to advance the insights
gained by both schools of thought over the past fifteen years. This should translate into continued scrutiny of IHL, increased focus on enforcement, further
(re)interpretation and, eventually, law reform to improve the situation of female
civilians in armed conflict.
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